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سیاسی و روابط بین الملل::
کشور بازدارنده
An aggressor might doubt, on the other hand, a defender's willingness to impose punishments.6 An aggressor might also convince itself that the defender will hesitate to follow through on threats to punish because of attendant risks, such as further escalation, that the deterring state may not be willing to run once the moment arrives.7 As Thomas Schelling noted, there are threats that a state would rather not fulfill, and weakness in deterrence can emerge when an aggressor believes the defender will ultimately prove unwilling to carry out its threats.8
Such steps include actions like stationing significant numbers of troops from the deterring state on the territory of the threatened nation, as the United States has done in many cases.
Using such a broader concept of dissuasion to describe what a deterring state is trying to do turns out to be especially important because of the ways in which threat-based deterrence strategies can go tragically wrong and provoke the very conflicts they are meant to avoid.17 Capabilities deployed to deter, for example, can end up convincing the other side that the deterring state is preparing an attack, making war look more necessary, rather than less.
Not only must the deterring state be precise in its commitments, but its target must understand them clearly.
And in the process, the defender is always calculating the degree of national interests involved: It may prefer not to see a certain form of aggression, but if the target of that attack is not vitally important to the deterring state, it will seldom be capable of broadcasting unambiguous deterrent threats in peacetime.
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